This paper (1) proposes new variables to detect informed highfrequency trading (HFT), (2) shows that HFT can help to predict takeover targets, and (3) shows that HFT influences target announcement announcement returns. Prior literature suggests that informed trade may occur before takeovers, but has not examined the role of HFT and has relied on monthly measures of informed trade (such as PIN or the spread components). I propose microstructure-based variables to detect HFT that are derived from hazard modeling and from VWAP trading algorithms. I show that these can help predict takeover targets and are significantly related to target announcement returns. This highlights the existence of pre-takeover informed trade and the need to control for it when analyzing takeover returns.
Introduction
This paper proposes measures to detect high frequency trading (HFT), shows that HFT can help predict takeover targets, and finds that HFT influences * Email address: M.HumpheryJenner@unsw.edu.au. I thank Rudiger Fahlenbrach, Fariborz Moshirian, Ronan Powell, Jianxin Wang, Ken Wessen, and Bohui Zhang. I also benefited from comments at the 2009 Australasian Finance and Banking Conference. 1 target announcement returns. I contribute to the literature on the detection of HFT and informed trade, takeover returns, and takeover prediction. The intuition for focusing on HFT is twofold. First, high-levels of HFT represent a liquid investor base, implying that there may be a stronger market reaction on the announcement. Second, high levels of HFT might reflect preannouncement informed speculation, implying the possibility of a takeover and suggesting pre-takeover informed trade. This implies that failing to control for HFT might induce an omitted variable bias in studies that analyze takeover returns, and contributes to the policy debate on the regulation of HFT.
HFT has proliferated and has become a live regulatory issue. HFT and algorithmic trading have increased in popularity (Chew, 2007; Degryse, Van Achter and Wuyts, 2009 ). Up to 67% of investment managers indicate that they use trading algorithms (Grossman, 2005) . They may become more prolific due to the emergence of 'best execution' requirements as in MIFID (following Anolli and Petrella, 2007; Brandes and Domowitz, 2011) . Trading algorithms provide one way to for informed traders to shift large blocks of stock while minimizing transaction costs (Humphery-Jenner, 2011; Kissell, Glantz and Malamut, 2004; Malamut, 2005, 2006) . Subsequently, HFT has been linked to market manipulation and informed trade, raising the possibility of regulating HFT (Bhupathi, 2010; McGowan, 2010; Serritella, 2010) . However, there is a dearth of tractable proxies for the presence of HFT, and the literature has not analyzed the relation between HFT and 2 informed trade.
The motivation of this study is to contribute to, and to address gaps in, four strands of literature: informed trade measurement, pre-takeover informed trade, takeover prediction, and the determinants of target returns. Second, I contribute to the literature on pre-announcement informed trade. The important finding is that there is some evidence of pre-takeover informed trade. find a stock-price run-up in targets and acquirers before takeover announcements. Cao, Chen and Griffin (2005) find significant informed trade in the options market before takeover 3 announcements. Farinós Viñas, Garcia and Ibanez (2003) find that the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread increases before a takeover announcement. Further, Aktas, de Bodt, Declerck and Van Oppens (2007) indicate that order-imbalance is higher before a takeover announcement; however, find little relation between PIN and merger announcements.
The problem with most of these results are (1) they rely on 'monthly'-type variables. For example, PIN or the decomposition of the bid-ask spread require at least a month of intraday data. (2) The insider trading papers usually rely on information about insider trades, 1 which is non-public and thus not useful to the general market. (3) the daily measures (such as daily order imbalance) ignore intraday trading patterns; and thus, exclude potentially useful information. I show that there is daily 'informed trade' (as proxied by the intraday frequency of trading) in target stock before takeover announcements.
Third, the paper contributes to the takeover prediction literature. Myriad papers have attempted to predict takeover targets. These models aim to predict targets in order to capture abnormal returns on and after the announcement of a takeover. These models are typically based on annual (sometimes quarterly) firm-level data (see Barnes, 1990 Barnes, , 1999 Powell, 2001 Powell, , 1997 The studies have not analyzed pre-takeover informed trade as a prediction mechanism. This is a problem due to the hypothesized presence of informed HFT before takeovers.
Fourth, I show an additional driver of takeover (target) returns. The literature indicates that targets earn significant abnormal returns in the window surrounding a takeover announcement.
2 Prior literature has also examined the drivers of acquirer returns. Prior literature has not examined HFT as a driver of returns. However, HFT might influence returns by (a) representing greater market interest in the stock, suggesting a more liquid market and a potentially greater reaction to news; and (b) indicating pre-announcement informed trade and speculation, which might impound takeover-related information. Thus, failure to properly control for pre-takeover HFT might induce omitted variable bias in cross-sectional regressions of acquirer and/or target returns.
The results confirm the presence of informed trade before takeover announcements and highlight the importance of HFT-based proxies. These proxies are significantly related to the occurrence of takeover events and to takeover returns. I obtain these results by analyzing a sample of firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) between 1998 and 2008. The sample comprises 1014 firm-day observations on which there is a takeover bid, and 1,262,468 firm-day observations on which there is no takeover bid. Advantages of using the ASX are that (a) it has a wide cross-section of both liquid and liquid stocks, (b) it has allowed direct market access for the whole of the sample period (thereby facilitating electronic trading), (c) has had a purely electronic limit order book for the whole of the sample period (as op-
posed to an open out cry market), (d) it has strong insider trading rules and an effective regulatory. These results should be generalizable to all developed markets that enable direct market access.
The balance of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 proposes ways to capture the presence of HFT. Section 3 describes the sample and empirical methodology. Section 4 contains the results and Section 5 concludes.
Measuring trade frequency
The first issue is to determine how to measure the presence of HFT. 
Weibull Shape Parameter
Here, I observe that there is a time interval between trades. Gourieroux, Jasiak and Le Fol (1999) observe that the duration between trades indicates 6 the level of trade intensity, and imply that it may imply informed trade.
I cull this time interval a 'lull' in trading. A shorter time-interval means higher-frequency trade. Thus, one approach is to model the time between trades. I focus on modeling the time until a trading lull ends. The Weibull distribution is particularly appropriate for modeling this trading lull. The
Weibull distribution has seen frequent use in the failure prediction literature.
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Thus, I use the shape parameter for the Weibull distribution.
I compute the shape parameter using a method of moments approach. 4 I assume a two-parameter Weibull model. This model has a scale parameter (α) and a shape parameter (β). The goal is to find an estimate for β. The process is:
1. Define the the first and second moments as: 
Expected Turnover i,t b = Ave Turnover i,t b over past 30 days
I use five minute intervals and focus on the absolute value of the deviation on grounds that both lulls and spikes in volume can convey information. I define the ordinary amount traded in any five minute interval as the average proportion of turnover traded in that five minute interval over the past month. 9
Intraday Order Imbalance
The third variable is the intraday order imbalance. Aktas, de Bodt, Declerck and Van Oppens (2007) show that daily order imbalance is more informative around takeover announcements than are PIN and the spread components.
The order imbalance is the number of buy orders less the number of sell orders divided by the total number of buy and sell orders. I focus on the absolute order imbalance (as per Aktas, de Bodt, Declerck and Van Oppens, 2007) . I calculate the order imbalance at five minute intervals and control for the moving average of the intraday order imbalance over the past five days.
Methods and Materials

Empirical Strategy
I analyze whether HFT (a) helps to predict takeover activity, and (b) influences takeover returns. The main independent variables are the HFT variables. I measure these over some interval starting 11 days before day t.
The baseline HFT variable is just the variable on day t − 11. However, I also report results for the variable over a 5 day window (from t − 11 to t − 15) and a 30 day window (from t − 11 to t − 40).
The prediction models use logit regressions. Here, the dependent variable is an indicator that firm i receives a takeover offer within day t and day t + j, denoted Bid t+j t . I focus on the firm receiving a bid over the windows (t, t + 5), (t, t + 10), (t, t + 30) . The binomial logit model is common in the literature (see e.g. Brar, Giamouridis and Liodakis, 2009; Palepu, 1986 The logit model is in Equation (8).
The returns models use panel regressions and OLS regressions. There are three sets of models. First, I examine only takeover targets. The sample comprises only firms that receive a takeover offer. The dependent variable is the firm's 'return' on the date of the offer. The return is variously the firm's raw return, the firm's market adjusted return, or the firm's industry (GICS sector) adjusted return. I prefer the industry/market adjusted return to the market-model-based abnormal return because some firms in the Australian market are illiquid; 8 and thus, might have biased and inconsistent market model parameters (Dimson and Marsh, 1983; Scholes and Williams, 1977) .
The model is in Equation (9).
6 The results are robust to clustering by the alternative industry definition, the 'GICS group'
7 The results are robust to using GICS group rather than GICS sector and to using industry dummies. GICs codes, rather than SIC codes, are standard industry classifications for Australian companies.
8 On the potential illiquidity of the Australian market see (Humphery-Jenner, 2011) .
Second, I examine takeover targets and non-targets together. The sample comprises all firms in the market. This is an unbalanced panel data set where I observe each firm on each day. Thus, I run a firm-date panel fixed-effects regression that also clusters standard errors by GICS sector. 9 The dependent variables are variously the firm's stock return, GICS sector adjusted return, and market adjusted return. The main independent variables are the HFT variables, an indicator that the firm receives a bid on day t, and the interaction thereof. If pre-announcement HFT drives returns, then the interaction term should be positive and significant. The model is in Equation (10). companies. Of these, 540 receive a bid at some time. These bids can be of varying sizes and for varying degrees of control. I do not require the bid to be successful.
Sample and variables
13 . There are 1014 firm-day observations on which there is a takeover bid, and 1,262,468 firm-day observations on which there is no takeover bid.
Independent Variables
I use two classes of independent variables. First, the takeover prediction models examine an indicator that equals one if the firm received a takeover offer between day t and t + k. I report results for k = 5, 10, 20. I obtain the takeover announcement dates from SDC platinum.
Second, the returns-based models examine the stock's return on day t.
I examine the raw return, the 'market adjusted' return (the raw return less 12 I note that some stocks have missing days for days when there were insufficient trades to compute microstructure variables.
13 Note that requiring the bid to be for 100% control of the company reduces number of bid-observations but increases the ability to detect a takeover the equally weighted market return) and the 'industry adjusted' return (the raw return less the equally weighted stock return for all stocks in the firm's GICS sector 14 ). The stock return data is from Reuters.
HFT Variables
Section 2 details the variables. I obtain the data to compute these variables from Reuters. I estimate both the raw variable on day t − 11 and the average of the HFT variable between day t − 11 and t − k, where k ∈ {1, . . . , 30}.
For brevity, I only report the 5 day window (t − 11 to t − 15) and the 30 day window (t − 11 to t − 40). The results hold for the intermediate windows.
The intraday data is from Reuters.
Control Variables
The control variables are factors that might help to predict the likelihood of a takeover. Note that Australia has different governance arrangements from the U.S: Australia forbids (1) anti-takeover provisions (Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011), (2) 'frustrating actions' designed purely to resist a takeover rather than to maximize shareholder value (Takeovers Panel, 2010, Guidance Note 12), and (3) dual-class shares in general. 15 Further, Australian compa-nies that list on the ASX must comply with the ASX corporate governance principles, which stimulate appropriate internal governance arrangements.
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Firm Size ('ln(Assets)'): Large size should weakly decrease the likelihood of a takeover. Large firms are more expensive to acquire; and thus, should be less likely to receive a takeover offer (Powell, 2001 (Powell, , 1997 . However, this effect is likely to be weak because: (1) Offenberg (2009) shows that size does not effectively entrench managers and protect them from disciplinary takeovers, suggesting that bidders focus more on the firm's price-to-book than on its mere size. (2) Australian companies tend to be smaller than companies in other countries (Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011) ; and thus, are should benefit less from a size-based entrenchment effect.
Debt/Assets: Financial leverage may influence the likelihood of a takeover.
One possibility is that leverage might reduces the likelihood of a takeover. This is for two reasons. First, leverage reduces free cash flows. This reduces Jensen (1986) type agency conflicts (following Harford, 1999; Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell, 1993) . This reduces the attractiveness of a disciplinary takeover. Second, leverage reduces available cash holdings. Faleye (2004) shows that cash rich firms are more likely to be taken over. Thus, leverage should reduce takeover likelihood. An alternative possibility is that class structure in 2008. AWB delisted in 2010. Nenova (2003) and Doidge (2004) report that only 3 Australian companies have dual-class shares.
16 These principles stipulate matters such as the firm's disclosure obligations and the required number of independent directors (ASX, 2003 (ASX, , 2008 .
The listing rules are available from http://www.asxgroup.com.au/ asx-listing-rules-guidance-notes-and-waivers.htm.
Different rules have applied at different times; however, year-dummies capture this change.
excess leverage can induce financial distress in industry downturns (see Opler and Titman, 1994) . This might motivate distress-motivated takeovers.
Market Cap/Assets: Highly stock prices make firms more attractive; and thus, less likely candidates for a takeover (Powell, 2001 (Powell, , 1997 . Thus, I control for the firm's market capitalization on day t divided by its assets reported in the last financial report.
Industry Adjusted Operating Performance (IAOP): Strongly per-
forming companies are less likely to be the subject of a disciplinary takeover, are more likely to trade at higher market prices; and thus, are less likely to be takeover targets. Thus, I control for the industry adjusted operating performance. The firm's operating performance is the its return on assets. The industry adjusted operating performance is the firm's ROA less the median ROA of firms in its GICS sector.
Industry M&A Activity: Takeover activity tends to occur in waves across time and industry (Harford, 2005; Powell and Yawson, 2005) . Thus, I control for the number of M&A deals in the firm's GICS sector over the past year scaled by the total number of M&A deals that occurred in the past year.
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High Tech Firm Indicator: High tech firms may be more apt takeover targets because (a) they tend to be smaller and (b) they may be subject 17 Robustness tests replace this variable with the total value of all deals in the firm's industry in the prior year divided by the total value of deals in the prior year. This variable does not significantly influence takeover likelihood and does not change the results for the main microstructure-based variables.
to bids designed to replace internal R&D with external technological acquisitions (Gerpott, 1995; Granstrand, Bohlin, Oskarsson and Sjöberg, 1992; Vanhaverbeke, Duysters and Noorderhaven, 2002) . The high tech firm indicator equals one if the firm's GICS group is pharmaceutical, semi-conductor, software, or information technology.
Industry Concentration (HHI):
Low industry concentration should increase the takeover likelihood as firms engage in 'roll-up' takeovers designed to maximize market share (Powell and Yawson, 2005) . Thus, I control for the HHI of the firm's GICS sector in the year.
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Cash Payment: The OLS models in Equation (9) also control for the method of payment. This is based on prior literature that shows that the method of payment influences the takeover premium and/or the market's reaction to the takeover (for acquire-returns results see Chang, 1998; Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller, 2002) .
Results and Analysis
Sample Description
The univariate statistics indicate that (a) takeover returns increase with the level of HFT and pre-takeover trading and (b) there are some key differences between target and non-target firms. Table 1 contains the statistics for the HFT variables. The main findings are: (1) The HFT variables are relatively stable over time-horizon; that is, the 1-day, 5-day, 15-day and 30-day moving averages are similar in magnitude.
(2) The HFT variables are stable across years. This is relatively unsurprising given that Australia has allowed direct market access for the whole of the sample period. (3) The HFT variables may differ between targets and non-targets. Specifically, Panel C contains statistics sorted by firm-size and whether the firm receives a takeover bid on day t. Small targets (assets in the bottom 50% of the sample) have higher HFT than do small non-targets.
However, large targets have lower HFT than do large non-targets. This implies that a multivariate regression framework is necessary to fully analyze the relation between takeovers and HFT. Table 4 contains the firm-level statistics for targets and non-targets.
There are some significant differences between targets and non-targets. The differences quadrate with prior literature (see Brar, Giamouridis and Liodakis, 2009; Powell, 2001 Powell, , 1997 . This implies that it is important to control for these factors when analyzing takeover prediction/returns. Table 2 and Table 3 focus on takeover targets. Table 2 only examines firmday combinations on which the firm receives a takeover bid. The main result is that there are positive returns on such days (the raw, market adjusted, and industry adjusted returns are positive). However, the returns are of relatively small magnitude. This is because I do not require the takeover bid to be completed or to be for 100% control of the company. Table 3 contains correlations between the returns and the HFT variables. The key result is that there is a significant positive correlation between most HFT variables and the stock returns.
Overall, the results suggest that there is a relationship between (a) HFT variables, (b) the occurrence of a takeover, and (c) takeover returns. However, when analyzing this relationship it is necessary to control for firm-level characteristics.
Takeover Return Results
This section discusses the takeover return results. The predictions are that pre-takeover informed trade is positively related to takeover returns. That is, 
Takeover Prediction Results
The main goal is to examine whether intraday variables can help to predict takeover events. Table 8 contains the prediction results. The key result is that the Weibull shape parameter significantly predicts takeover events. Further, the intraday abnormal trunover is positive and significant at 1% in most models. This implies that there is a high level of intraday-based abnormal trade before takeover announcements.
The control variables have some important implications. First, volatile companies are more likely to be acquired. Companies with a high stock return variance are significantly more likely to receive a bid in all models. This is unsurpising given that high stock variance can represent a high dispersion of opinion and information asymmetry.
Second, high market-to-book ratios reduce takeover likelihood. The coefficient on 'Market Cap/Assets' is negative and significant in all models. This implies that 'expensive' companies are less likely to receive takeover offers.
An explanation is that high stock prices deter disciplinary (or opportunistic) takeovers that are designed to acquire cheap assets and/or to remove poorly performing managers. 
Robustness
This section indicates that the results are robust. Table 5 contains the takeover returns results. The sample comprises takeover targets. The models include year dummies and use robust standard errors clustered by GICS sector. The dependent variable is variously the firm's raw return (denoted 'Return'), the market-adjusted return ('MAR'), or the GICS sector (industry) adjusted return ('IAR'). The main independent variables are the moving average of the Weibull shape parameter, intraday order imbalance, and intraday abnormal turnover. Table 7 contains panel random effects results. The sample comprises all firms listed on the ASX that have the relevant variables. The models are panel random effects models with company/date panels. The dependent variable is variously the firm's raw return (denoted 'Return'), the market-adjusted return ('MAR'), or the GICS sector (industry) adjusted return ('IAR'). The main independent variables are the moving average of the Weibull shape parameter, intraday order imbalance, and intraday abnormal turnover. Table 8 contains the takeover prediction results. All models are logit models, include year dummies, and use robust standard errors clustered by GICS sector. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if a company becomes a takeover target in the next 20 days (in Columns 1-3), 10 days (in Columns 4-6), or 5 days (in Columns 7-9). The main independent variables are the moving average of the Weibull shape parameter, intraday order imbalance, and intraday abnormal turnover. Figure 1: ROC Curves Figure 1 contains the ROC curves for logit models that predict the occurrence of a takeover within 5, 10, or 20 days.
